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INTRODUCTION
The conventional capital asset pricing model (CAPM) remains 
the preferred approach to risk management in a wide range of 
economic settings. At the same time, the neoclassical assumptions 
underlying the CAPM have come under severe attack by behavioral 
economics. In sharp contrast with the purely rational agents of 
neoclassical economics, real humans make decisions under the 
constraints imposed by their innate heuristics. The tension between 
conventional asset pricing theory and behavioral economics puts 
particular pressure on law. As an applied branch of social science, 
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law purports to subject human conduct to rules that should optimize 
objective well-being as well as subjective satisfaction. 
This Article proposes a mathematically expedient method of 
alleviating this tension. A four-moment capital asset pricing model 
captures the emotional impact of odd and even moments of statistical 
distributions. Critically, a four-moment CAPM transcends the limits 
of financial models that consider nothing beyond mean and variance 
in the distribution of returns. At an absolute minimum, four-moment 
CAPM gives mathematical voice to one of the key findings of 
prospect theory: the preference for skewed, lottery-like returns from 
actuarially unfavorable gambles. 
Part I of this Article outlines the conventional capital asset 
pricing model. Part II describes prospect theory, perhaps the most 
celebrated expression of behavioral economics. To bridge the gap 
between the CAPM’s neoclassical assumptions and prospect theory’s 
behavioral observations, Part III specifies a four-moment capital 
asset pricing model based on a Taylor series expansion of 
logarithmic returns. Part IV examines instances of skewness 
preference across the landscape of financial economics. Part V pays 
close attention to pricing problems of initial public offerings as a 
special case. 
I. THE CONVENTIONAL CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL
The conventional capital asset pricing model remains the 
dominant paradigm in financial risk management1—at least among 
                                                
1. See, e.g., Fischer Black, Capital Market Equilibrium with Restricted 
Borrowing, 45 J. BUS. 444, 444 (1972); Fischer Black, Michael C. Jensen & Myron 
Scholes, The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Some Empirical Tests, in STUDIES IN THE 
THEORY OF CAPITAL MARKETS 79 (Michael C. Jensen ed., 1972); John Lintner, 
Security Prices, Risk, and Maximal Gains from Diversification, 20 J. FIN. 587, 587 
(1965); John Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky 
Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. ECON. & STAT. 13, 14 
(1965); Jan Mossin, Equilibrium in a Capital Asset Market, 34 ECONOMETRICA 768, 
769 (1966); William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium 
Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425, 427 (1964); Jack L. Treynor, Towards a 
Theory of Market Value of Risky Assets, in ASSET PRICING AND PORTFOLIO 
PERFORMANCE: MODELS, STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE METRICS 15 (Robert A. 
Korajczyk ed., 1999); Jack L. Treynor & Fischer Black, Corporate Investment 
Decisions, in MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 310-27 (Stewart 
C. Myers ed., 1976). See generally Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Capital 
Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 25 (2004); BERNELL 
KENNETH STONE, RISK, RETURN, AND EQUILIBRIUM: A GENERAL SINGLE-PERIOD 
THEORY OF ASSET SELECTION AND CAPITAL MARKET EQUILIBRIUM (1970). 
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practitioners, if not among scholars.2 Once upon a time, long ago, 
“the hegemony of the CAPM” could be attributed “mostly to its 
apparent ease of applicability and, to a lesser extent, its empirical 
justification.”3 The latter excuse, at least, has withered away. Despite 
evidence that beta is not positively related to returns on stock,4 much 
of contemporary financial theory still hinges on the CAPM. With 
resilience worthy “of cartoon characters like Wile E. Coyote who 
have the ability to come back to original shape after being blown to 
pieces,” the CAPM persists “because (a) the empirical support for 
other asset-pricing models is no better, (b) the theory behind the 
CAPM has an intuitive appeal that other models lack, and (c) the 
economic importance of the empirical evidence against the CAPM 
. . . is ambiguous.”5
“It takes a better theory to kill an existing theory,” and the 
financial profession has “yet to see [a] better theory.”6 Even Eugene 
Fama, beta’s leading nemesis, has conceded that “market 
professionals (and academics) still think about risk in terms of 
market β.”7 Courts and other legal decision makers are even more 
committed to thinking of financial risk and asset pricing in terms of 
the conventional CAPM.8 In law and professional practice, if not in 
academic theory, the capital asset pricing model is alive and well.9
                                                
2. See HAIM LEVY, THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY: ANALYTICAL, EMPIRICAL, AND BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES 4-5 (2012) 
(describing the CAPM and its constituent concepts, “particularly beta,” as “probably 
the most widely employed financial measures used by academic researchers” and 
“even more intensively used by investment firms and practitioners”).
3. Philip H. Dybvig & Jonathan E. Ingersoll, Jr., Mean-Variance Theory in 
Complete Markets, 55 J. BUS. 233, 233 (1982). 
4. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Cross-Section of 
Expected Stock Returns, 47 J. FIN. 427, 428 (1992); see also Marc R. Reinganum, A
New Empirical Perspective on the CAPM, 16 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
439, 439 (1981); Seha M. Tinic & Richard R. West, Risk and Return: January vs. 
the Rest of the Year, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 561, 573 (1984). 
5. Ravi Jagannathan & Zhenyu Wang, The Conditional CAPM and the 
Cross-Section of Expected Returns, 51 J. FIN. 3, 4 (1996) (footnote omitted). 
6. TIM KOLLER, MARC GOEDHART & DAVID WESSELS, VALUATION:
MEASURING AND MANAGING THE VALUE OF COMPANIES 261 (5th ed. 2010). 
7. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1593 
(1991); accord Glenn N. Pettengill, Sridhar Sundaram & Ike Mathur, The 
Conditional Relation Between Beta and Returns, 30 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 101, 102 (1995). 
8. See, e.g., In re Am. Classic Voyages Co., 367 B.R. 500, 513 n.19 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (“While there are other models to determine equity, CAPM is 
probably the most widely used.” (quoting Peter V. Pantaleo & Barry W. Ridings, 
Reorganization Value, 51 BUS. LAW. 419, 433 n.52 (1996))); cf. AEP Tex. N. Co. v. 
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The CAPM expresses return on an asset as a function of risk, 
which in turn can be expressed as volatility, beta, or some other 
measure drawn from the second moment of the distribution of 
financial returns.10 The independent development, particularly by 
William Sharpe and John Lintner, of “general models represent[ing] 
equivalent approaches to the problem of capital asset pricing under 
uncertainty” gave rise to what we recognize today as the CAPM.11
The capital asset pricing model quantifies the premium 
demanded by the market for shouldering that asset’s volatility over a 
benchmark represented by the return on a risk-free investment:12
)( fmafa RRRR  
where Ra, Rm, and Rf respectively represent returns on the asset, on 
the broader market of comparable investments, and on a risk-free 
investment, and where βa represents the individual asset’s beta vis-à-
vis a portfolio based on the broader market.13 This formula takes the 
form of a linear equation where the return on an asset (Ra) is 
expressed as a function of the premium over a risk-free baseline 
(Rm − Rf).14
Within the capital asset pricing model, beta (βa) represents the 
slope of the linear function, and the risk-free return (Rf) is a constant 
that defines the function’s y-intercept.15 Modest algebraic 
rearrangement of the capital asset pricing model yields the following 
relationship: 
                                                                                                      
Surface Transp. Bd., 609 F.3d 432, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (observing that courts “do 
not sit as . . . panel[s] of statisticians, but as . . . panel[s] of generalist judges”).
9. See Haim Levy, The CAPM Is Alive and Well: A Review and Synthesis,
16 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 43, 43 (2009); cf. LEVY, supra note 2, at 22 (describing the 
CAPM and related models of mean-variance optimization as “still ‘alive and 
kicking’”).
10. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, 
Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 262 (1958). 
11. Eugene F. Fama, Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Some Clarifying 
Comments, 23 J. FIN. 29, 40 (1968). 
12. See Modigliani & Miller, supra note 10, at 262. 
13. See Robert A. Korajczyk, Introduction to ASSET PRICING AND 
PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE: MODELS, STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE METRICS, at xv 
(Robert A. Korajczyk ed., 1999). 
14. See id.
15. See id.
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Rm  Rf 
Ra  Rf
a
The left side of the foregoing equation represents the risk premium
demanded for the entire asset class represented by a particular 
segment of the market.16 Modern portfolio theory expresses the risk 
premium as the difference between returns on a specific investment 
or class of investments and some sort of risk-free benchmark.17 This 
premium dictates a firm’s cost of capital; indeed, capital asset 
pricing, in its original incarnation, offered a solution to the problem 
of determining the price that investors would demand for bearing 
risk in excess of a risk-free alternative.18
Another common application of the capital asset pricing model 
compares an index of equities designed to track the Standard and 
Poor’s 500 against the putatively risk-free baseline of short-term 
Treasury bills.19 This market-wide risk premium is equivalent to the 
risk-adjusted premium expressed on the right side of the equation—
namely, the risk premium for the asset vis-à-vis a risk-free 
investment, divided by the individual asset’s beta.20
This ratio between risk-adjusted return and volatility bears 
closer examination. Recall that the foregoing equation is merely an 
algebraically reformulated version of the basic capital asset pricing 
model: 
Ra  Rf a (Rm Rf )
The ratio of (1) the premium over a baseline return to (2) the 
volatility associated with that asset or portfolio demonstrates how 
market returns are adjusted for risk, or for some surrogate such as 
volatility or beta: 
Treynor ratio
Ra Rb
a
                                                
16. See id. 
17. See Sharpe, supra note 1, at 426-27.
18. See Modigliani & Miller, supra note 10, at 262.  
19. See HANDBOOK OF QUANTITATIVE FINANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT 10
(Cheng-Few Lee, Alice C. Lee & John Lee eds., 2010). 
20. See Korajczyk, supra note 13, at xv. 
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Algebraic manipulation, in one direction or another, connects 
the Treynor ratio of reward to volatility with the more general capital 
asset pricing model. Indeed, the Treynor ratio restates the capital 
asset pricing model. Although mathematical congruence undermines 
the contribution of the Treynor ratio to the testing of the capital asset 
pricing model as a scientific hypothesis,21 this definitional unity does 
make the Treynor ratio a convenient tool for evaluating and 
understanding the broader model of asset pricing. The Treynor ratio 
demonstrates that the general risk premium of a class of investments 
(such as the broader market of all publicly traded equities in the 
United States) is equivalent to the premium for a specific investment 
over risk-free return, discounted by the volatility of returns on that 
specific asset relative to returns on the benchmark class as a whole.22
In other words, we can extrapolate the Treynor ratio from the capital 
asset pricing model, and the capital asset pricing model from the 
Treynor ratio. 
The Treynor ratio measures reward as return on an asset, Ra,
above some benchmark return, Rb, relative to the volatility of that 
asset’s return as expressed by its beta, βa.23 The benchmark return, 
Rb, often is, but need not be, equivalent to the risk-free baseline, Rf.
The Treynor ratio closely resembles a generalized version of the 
Sharpe ratio of reward to variability (as measured by the standard 
deviation of portfolio returns):24
Generalized Sharpe ratio 
Ra Rb

What unites the Sharpe and Treynor ratios is the evaluation of 
portfolio returns or portfolio manager performance according to the 
relationship between returns and some proxy for risk, whether 
volatility as measured through standard deviation or relative 
correlated volatility as measured through beta.25
                                                
21. See Richard Roll, A Critique of the Asset Pricing Theory’s Tests, 4 J.
FIN. ECON. 129, 130 (1977). 
22. See Treynor, supra note 1, at 17. 
23. Id. at 16-17.
24. See William F. Sharpe, Mutual Fund Performance, 39 J. BUS. 119, 127 
(1966); William F. Sharpe, Adjusting for Risk in Portfolio Performance 
Measurement, 1 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 29, 30 (1975) [hereinafter Sharpe, Adjusting 
for Risk in Portfolio Performance Measurement].
25. See J.D. Jobson & Bob M. Korkie, Performance Hypothesis Testing 
with the Sharpe and Treynor Measures, 36 J. FIN. 889, 891 (1981); Sharpe, 
Adjusting for Risk in Portfolio Performance Measurement, supra note 24, at 127. 
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II. PROSPECT THEORY
The conventional CAPM rests upon a highly stylized 
theoretical foundation assuming perfectly rational economic agents. 
Law and other fields applying financial economics have struggled to 
account for behavioral departures from neoclassical assumptions of 
perfect rationality. Perhaps the most celebrated framework for 
explaining human decision-making under the influence of risk 
aversion and risk seeking is prospect theory. At a minimum, 
“prospect theory is . . . widely viewed as the best available 
description of how people evaluate risk in experimental settings.”26
Prospect theory has inspired a deeper body of work in behavioral 
economics.27
In their 1979 article that laid the initial foundations for prospect 
theory, Daniel Kahneman and Aaron Tversky identified varying 
conditions under which economic agents can be expected to behave 
in risk-averse or in risk-seeking ways.28 For example, in a “situation 
where winning is possible but not probable, most people choose the 
prospect that offers the larger gain.”29 The possibility of a certain 
outcome within a mixed prospect renders certainty a special case of a 
broader “isolation effect,” whereby the evaluation of distinct 
components of alternative choices can “produce inconsistent 
preferences.”30 Moreover, upon examining not only “positive 
prospects,” or “prospects that involve no losses,” but also the impact 
of reversing “the signs of the outcomes . . . so that gains are replaced 
by losses,” Kahneman and Tversky also identified a “reflection 
effect.”31 The significance of the reflection effect lies in its 
implication “that risk aversion in the positive domain is accompanied 
by risk seeking in the negative domain.”32
                                                
26. Nicholas C. Barberis, Thirty Years of Prospect Theory in Economics: A 
Review and Assessment, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 173, 173 (2013). 
27. See generally, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 278-
88 (2011); PETER P. WAKKER, PROSPECT THEORY: FOR RISK AND AMBIGUITY (2010). 
28. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis 
of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979). 
29. Id. at 267. 
30. Id. at 271. 
31. Id. at 268. 
32. Id. (citing C. Arthur Williams, Jr., Attitudes Toward Speculative Risks 
as an Indicator of Attitudes Toward Pure Risk, 33 J. RISK & INS. 577, 577-86 (1966); 
Peter C. Fishburn & Gary A. Kochenberger, Two-Piece von Neumann-Morgenstern 
Utility Functions, 10 DECISION SCI. 503, 503 (1979)). 
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Combining the certainty effect with the reflection effect 
dramatically changes the nature of risk aversion. “In the positive 
domain, the certainty effect contributes to a risk averse preference 
for a sure gain over a larger gain that is merely probable.”33 By 
contrast, “[i]n the negative domain,” the certainty effect “leads to a 
risk seeking preference for a loss that is merely probable over a 
smaller loss that is certain.”34 Because “the reflection effect 
eliminates aversion for uncertainty or variability” for losses, the 
“same psychological principle—the overweighting of certainty—
favors risk aversion in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the 
domain of losses.”35 In other words, “certainty increases the 
aversiveness of losses as well as the desirability of gains.”36
Prospect theory’s value function calculates utility according to 
“gains and losses rather than . . . final asset positions.”37 Noting “the 
presence of risk seeking in preferences among positive as well as 
among negative prospects,” Harry Markowitz had “proposed a utility 
function which has convex and concave regions in both the positive 
and the negative domains.”38 Prospect theory accordingly adopts a 
“value function” that is “concave for gains and . . . convex for 
losses.”39 Moreover, prospect theory treats “changes of wealth, rather 
than final asset positions that include current wealth,” as the true 
“carriers of value or utility.”40 “This conclusion,” a repudiation of 
expected utility theory, represents “the cornerstone” of prospect 
theory as “an alternative theory of risky choice.”41
Treating “changes in wealth or welfare, rather than final 
states,” as “carriers of value” harmonizes prospect theory “with basic 
principles of perception and judgment.”42 Human responses “to 
attributes such as brightness, loudness, or temperature” account for 
“the past and present context of experience.”43 As with physical 
stimuli, so with “non-sensory attributes such as health, prestige, and 
wealth.”44 “Many sensory and perceptual dimensions share the 
                                                
33. Id.
34. Id. at 268-69. 
35. Id. at 269. 
36. Id.
37. Id. at 274, 276. 
38. Id. at 276.  
39. Id. at 279. 
40. Id. at 273 (emphasis added). 
41. Id.
42. Id. at 277. 
43. Id.
44. Id.
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property that the psychological response is a concave function of the 
magnitude of physical change.”45 Again, by analogy to physical 
perception: “[I]t is easier to discriminate between a change of 3º and 
a change of 6º in room temperature, than it is to discriminate 
between a change of 13º and a change of 16º.”46 In principle, the 
same change in sensitivity applies “to the evaluation of monetary 
changes.”47
Kahneman and Tversky’s own summary of prospect theory’s 
value function thus identifies three distinctive properties. The value 
function is: 
(i) defined on deviations from the reference point; 
(ii) generally concave for gains and commonly convex for 
 losses; and 
(iii) steeper for losses than for gains.48
Stripped of its nuances, “prospect theory predicts that people 
generally make risk-averse decisions when choosing between options 
that appear to be gains and risk-seeking decisions when choosing 
between options that appear to be losses.”49 Especially as expanded 
by Tversky and Kahneman’s 1992 paper outlining a “cumulative” 
modification of their approach,50 prospect theory makes behavioral 
predictions arising from three basic features of human beings’ core 
cognitive system.51
First, all decision-making takes place relative to a neutral 
reference point, or “aspiration level.”52 Outcomes exceeding this 
reference point are gains. Outcomes below the reference point are 
losses.53 “Risk is the prospect of not meeting the target rate of return 
                                                
45. Id. at 278. 
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 279. 
49. Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 NW.
U. L. REV. 1115, 1116 (2003). 
50. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: 
Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297, 299 (1992). 
51. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 27, at 282. 
52. See John W. Payne, Dan J. Laughhunn & Roy Crum, Translation of 
Gambles and Aspiration Level Effects in Risky Choice Behavior, 26 MGMT. SCI. 1039, 
1039 (1980); John W. Payne, Dan J. Laughhunn & Roy Crum, Further Tests of 
Aspiration Level Effects in Risky Choice Behavior, 27 MGMT. SCI. 953, 953 (1981). 
53. See Peter C. Fishburn, Mean-Risk Analysis with Risk Associated with 
Below- Target Returns, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 116, 116-26 (1977). 
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. . . [i]f you are one hundred percent sure of making the target return, 
then it is a zero risk proposition.”54
Second, loss aversion means that losses, when directly 
weighted or compared against gains, loom larger.55 This is one 
respect in which prospect theory preserves the premises of expected 
utility theory. Prospect theory assumes that most individuals, as an 
expression of innate risk aversion, fear potential losses more than 
they covet potential gains.56 Within a formal economic framework, 
“loss aversion” eliminates the neutrality of “the dynamic aggregation 
rules people follow.”57 The Supreme Court of the United States long 
ago rendered this sentiment in more straightforward terms: “Threat 
of loss, not hope of gain, is the essence of economic coercion.”58
Even more plainly, “[l]osing hurts worse than winning feels good.”59
Third and finally, diminishing sensitivity applies to upward and 
downward perceptions and to evaluation of changes of wealth.60 In 
concert, these three principles—neutral reference point, loss 
aversion, and diminishing sensitivity—can be illustrated through a 
graph showing an asymmetrical sigmoid curve whose inflection 
point occurs at the neutral adaptation level, whose steeper slope 
below the adaptation level demonstrates loss aversion, and whose 
declining rate of change in both directions reflects diminishing 
sensitivity to gains and to losses.61 Exploiting the mathematical 
properties of well-behaved cumulative distribution functions (which 
after all “are positive, have positive first derivatives—the probability 
densities—and if they are unimodal, have negative second 
derivatives beyond the mode”) generates a value function that 
satisfies these conditions.62
                                                
54. James C.T. Mao, Survey of Capital Budgeting: Theory and Practice, 25 
J. FIN. 349, 353 (1970); see also Robert Libby & Peter C. Fishburn, Behavioral 
Models of Risk Taking in Business Decisions: A Survey and Evaluation, 15 J. ACCT.
RES. 272, 288-89 (1977). 
55. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 27, at 282. 
56. Id. 
57. See Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Myopic Loss Aversion and 
the Equity Premium Puzzle, 110 Q.J. ECONOMICS 73, 74 (1995).
58. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 81 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting). 
59. LEWIS GRIZZARD, GETTIN’ IT ON: A DOWN-HOME TREASURY 72 (1989); 
accord JOE GARAGIOLA, IT’S ANYBODY’S BALLGAME 108-09 (1988). Lewis Grizzard 
(1946-94) was a humor columnist for the Atlanta Journal-Constitution. 
60. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 27, at 282. 
61. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 28, at 282-83.
62. Denis Conniffe, The Generalised Extreme Value Distribution as Utility 
Function, 38 ECON. & SOC. REV. 275, 275 (2007); see also Marco LiCalzi & 
Annamaria Sorato, The Pearson System of Utility Functions, 172 EUR. J.
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Without loss of generality, we can illustrate prospect theory’s 
value function through a transformation of the cumulative 
distribution function of a lognormal distribution with parameters 
 = 0 and  = √3/5:
F(ln x; ,)  erf
ln(x 1)  
 2
	






F(ln x;   0,  3
5
)  erf
5ln(x 1)
6
	






A plot of that function alongside F(x;  1,   5) 
2  (x 1)5
1 (x 1)5
1,
the corresponding cumulative distribution function of the log-logistic 
distribution, ultimately looks like this:63
“If prospect theory had a flag, this image would be drawn on it.”64
                                                                                                      
OPERATIONAL RES. 560, 560-73 (2006); James Ming Chen, Flagging Prospect 
Theory 1 (Feb. 13, 2009) (unpublished method paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2216916 [https://perma.cc/PE3U-7723].  
63. I entered the following command in Wolfram Alpha: plot 
erf(5*ln(x+1)/sqrt(6)) and 2*(x+1)^5/(1+(x+1)^5)-1 for -1<x<1. 
64. KAHNEMAN, supra note 27, at 282. 
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III. A FOUR-MOMENT CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL
Mathematical analysis provides a way to harmonize the 
conventional capital asset pricing model with behavioral economics. 
Overtly behavioral interpretations of moment-based theories of 
finance associate different moments with different emotions.65 Law 
and other fields of applied behavioral science require financial 
models whose primary or even exclusive purpose is to describe 
economic behavior as undertaken by actual humans, as opposed to 
hypothetical economic reason dictated by quantitative logic. 
Prospect theory, in particular, reflects “the psychophysics of 
chances.”66 Although “[p]sychophysical theories and moments 
theories are theories of Everyman because they are based 
mechanistically on principles” that are presumed to bind all of 
humanity,67 mathematical specification of behavioral theories of 
Everyman represents a first step toward richer accounts of the full 
range of considerations, rational and emotional, that affect human 
decisions. 
We can reduce the conceptual distance separating the 
conventional capital asset pricing model from behavioral economics 
by adopting a four-moment variant of the CAPM. If mean-variance 
optimization arises “from the idea that the investor prefers higher 
expected returns and lower risk,” then higher-moment CAPM 
presumes, “ceteris paribus, investors prefer a high probability of an 
extreme event in the positive direction over a high probability of an 
extreme event in the negative direction.”68 On that assumption, 
mean-variance optimization under the conventional CAPM 
represents merely a special case of a more comprehensive model that 
accounts for asymmetry in returns (as expressed by skewness) and 
the relative probability of extreme events in the distribution of 
                                                
65. See, e.g., Ole Hagen, Separation of Cardinal Utility and Specific Utility 
of Risk in Theory of Choices Under Uncertainty, 3 SAERTRYKK AV STATSØKONOMISK 
TIDSSKRIFT 81 (1969). 
66. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 
AM. PSYCHOL. 341, 344 (1984). 
67. Lola L. Lopes, Between Hope and Fear: The Psychology of Risk, 20 
ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 255, 283 (1987). 
68. Campbell R. Harvey et al., Portfolio Selection with Higher Moments, 10 
QUANTITATIVE FIN. 469, 471 (2010); Gustavo M. de Athayde & Renato G. Flôres 
Jr., Finding a Maximum Skewness Portfolio—A General Solution to Three-Moments 
Portfolio Choice, 28 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 1335, 1342 (2004). 
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returns (as expressed by kurtosis).69 The goal, therefore, is to devise a 
theoretically coherent account of investor preferences with respect to 
no fewer than the first four moments—mean, variance, skewness, 
and kurtosis. 
One mathematically cogent “way of dealing with higher 
moments in the asset allocation is the use of the Taylor series 
expansion to derive an approximation of the expected utility 
function.”70 A higher-order Taylor series expansion can “simplify[] 
the asset allocation task”71 and inform “optimal portfolio selection in 
the presence of . . . higher order moments and parameter 
uncertainty.”72 Specifically, to “measur[e] the effect of higher 
moments on . . . asset allocation,” we can “approximate the expected 
utility by a Taylor series expansion around the expected wealth.”73
The Taylor series expansion for a function, f(x), that is 
infinitely differentiable at value a takes the form of a power series:74
f (x)  f (a) 
f (a)
1!
(x  a) 
f (a)
2!
(x  a)2  
f (a)
3!
(x  a)3 
Exploiting multiple mathematical identities—namely, that (x – a)0
and 0! both equal 1, and the zeroth order derivative of f(x) is f(x)
itself—enables us to express the Taylor series expansion in a more 
compact form: 
f (x) 
f (n )(a)
n!
(x  a)n
n0


Accordingly, if an investor’s “utility function is expressed in 
terms of the wealth distribution, so that”:
                                                
69. See Eric Jondeau & Michael Rockinger, Optimal Portfolio Allocation 
Under Higher Moments, 12 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 29, 33 (2006). 
70. Id. at 30. 
71. Harvey et al., supra note 68, at 470. 
72. Id. at 469. 
73. Jondeau & Rockinger, supra note 69, at 33. 
74. See Taylor Series, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taylor_series 
[https://perma.cc/2VKF-S8XT] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). Unless otherwise noted, 
background information on the mathematics of the Taylor series expansion comes 
from this source. The special case of a Taylor series where a = 0 is often designated 
a Maclaurin series. 
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U(w)  U(w) f (w) dw

“where f(w) is the probability distribution function of end-of-period 
wealth, that depends on the multivariate distribution of returns” and 
the weights of the portfolio’s components, then “the infinite-order 
Taylor series expansion of the utility function is”:
U(w) 
U(n )(w )(w w )n
n!n0


where  1ww  designates the expected end-of-period 
wealth, µ designates the vector of expected returns, and  designates 
the vector of portfolio weights.75
The application of this model to a simple set of financial 
returns is even more straightforward. “Let R and r denote simple 
(arithmetic) and logarithmic (continuously compounded) returns 
respectively . . . .”76 By definition, rt = ln(1+Rt),77 where rt designates 
the “continuously compounded return or log return . . . of an asset” 
and “is defined to be the natural logarithm of [the asset’s] gross 
return (1+Rt).”78 It is important to express returns in logarithmic form 
and calculate geometric rather than arithmetic average returns. 
“When returns are serially correlated, then the arithmetic average can 
lead to misleading estimates . . . .”79 Arithmetic average return 
exceeds its geometric counterpart; “if the returns are log-normally 
distributed, the difference between the two is one-half the variance of 
the returns.”80 The computation of log returns not only overcomes 
“[t]he difficulty of manipulating geometric averages” but also allows 
the expression of “continuously compounded multiperiod return [as] 
simply the sum of continuously compounded single-period 
returns”:81
                                                
75. See Jondeau & Rockinger, supra note 69, at 33. 
76. Javier Estrada, Mean-Semivariance Behaviour: An Alternative 
Behavioural Model, 3 J. EMERGING MKT. FIN. 231, 241 (2004). 
77. See id.
78. JOHN Y. CAMPBELL, ANDREW W. LO & A. CRAIG MACKINLAY, THE 
ECONOMETRICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 11 (1997). 
79. Rajnish Mehra & Edward C. Prescott, The Equity Premium in 
Retrospect, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 890, 892 (George M. 
Constantinides, Milton Harris & René M. Stulz eds., 2003). 
80. Id. at 891. 
81. CAMPBELL, LO & MACKINLAY, supra note 78, at 11. 
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rt (k)  ln[1 Rt (k)]  ln[(1 Rt )  (1 Rt1)    (1 Rtk1)]
rt (k)  ln(1 Rt )  ln(1 Rt1)  ln(1 Rtk1)
rt (k)  rt  rt1   rtk1
Even more importantly, this expression of log returns lends 
itself to a very simple and elegant Taylor series expansion. For the 
logarithmic function ln(1+x), the Taylor series expansion takes this 
form:82
ln(1 x)  (1)n1
xn
nn1


Generalizing the Taylor series expansion to account for ln(1+x) at 
x = µ yields: 
ln(1 )
x  
1 

(x  )2
2(1 )2

(x  )3
3(1 )3

(x  )4
4(1 )4
o[(x  )5]
where o[(x )5] represents remaining terms of the fifth order and 
above.83 Inasmuch as time series also rely on logarithmic returns, a 
more elaborate third-order (or higher) Taylor series expansion may 
be derived by “relat[ing] the discount factor to the marginal rate of 
substitution between periods t and t + 1, in a two-period economy.”84
Somewhat optimistically, Javier Estrada leaps directly from 
this model to a Taylor series expansion that consists exclusively of 
alternative central statistical moments. He is partially correct—and 
almost entirely correct if we modify the definition of skewness and 
kurtosis. If we “let µ and 2 [represent] the mean and variance of R,” 
then the conventional CAPM takes the form of a Taylor series 
expansion of expected returns:85
                                                
82. See Taylor Series, WIKIPEDIA, supra note 74. 
83. See Taylor Series for ln(1+x) at x=y, WOLFRAMALPHA,
http://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=taylor+series+for+ln%281%2Bx%29+at+x
%3Dy [https://perma.cc/67QM-WQLW] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). 
84. Campbell R. Harvey & Akhtar Siddique, Conditional Skewness in Asset 
Pricing Tests, 55 J. FIN. 1263, 1269 (2000). 
85. Estrada, supra note 76, at 241. 
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r  ln(1R)  ln(1 )
x  
1 

1
2


2
(1 )2
R2[ln(1R)]
where Rn(x) designates the remaining terms of the Taylor series 
expansion beyond order n (which in this example is 2).86 Estrada 
omits the second term of the series, 
x  
1 
, and takes no explicit 
account of the Taylor remainder. 
More explicitly, Estrada proposes to interpret the remainder 
term as direct implementations of skewness and kurtosis:87
r  ln(1R)  ln(1 ) 
1
2


2
(1 )2

1
3

Skew
(1 )3

1
4

Kurt
(1 )4
And, likewise, for “[a]n approximate expected utility based on mean, 
variance, skewness and kurtosis . . . [for] an investor [who] displays 
a logarithmic . . . utility function”:88
r  ln(1R)  ln(1 ) 
1
2


2
(1 )2

1
3

Skew
(1 )3

1
4

Kurt
(1 )4
Estrada’s interpretation of this Taylor series expansion is 
correct, but only if one defines skewness and kurtosis, respectively, 
as the third and fourth central moments rather than the third and 
fourth standardized moments. Potential confusion arises from other 
sources’ adoption of the definition of skewness as the third 
standardized moment, 1 
x  







3

3

3 .89 Note further that 
standard treatments of kurtosis subtract three from the fourth 
standardized moment in order to express excess kurtosis by reference 
                                                
86. See Taylor’s Theorem, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taylor% 
27s_theorem [https://perma.cc/AVQ3-CL2W] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). 
87. Estrada, supra note 76, at 241. 
88. Id. at 246. 
89. See, e.g., Leslie A. Balzer, Investment Risk: A Unified Approach to 
Upside and Downside Returns, in MANAGING DOWNSIDE RISK IN FINANCIAL 
MARKETS: THEORY, PRACTICE AND IMPLEMENTATION 103, 121 (Frank A. Sortino & 
Stephen E. Satchell eds., 2001). 
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to the kurtosis of a normal Gaussian distribution: 
2  2  3 
4

4  3.
In the interest of precision, we should restate Estrada’s 
interpretation of the Taylor series expansion of log returns: 
ln(1 x) at (x  )
 ln(1 )
x  
1 

(x  )2
2(1 )2

(x  )3
3(1 )3

(x  )4
4(1 )4
 o[(x  )5]
 ln(1 ) x  
1 


2
2(1 )2

3
3(1 )3

4
4(1 )4
 o(5)
Therefore, this Taylor series expansion does correspond to 
definitions for skewness and kurtosis,90 but only if we define 
“skewness and kurtosis . . . as central higher moments” in place of 
these terms’ traditional “statistical definitions as standardised central 
higher moments.”91
If we insist, very modest rearrangement allows us to restate the 
Taylor series expansion in terms of more traditional interpretations 
of skewness and kurtosis—namely, 1, 2, and 2: 
ln(1 x) at (x  )
 ln(1 )
x  
1 


2
2(1 )2

1
3
3(1 )3

2
4
4(1 )4
 o(5)
 ln(1 ) x  
1 


2
2(1 )2

1
3
3(1 )3

( 2  3)
4
4(1 )4
 o(5)
The advantage of defining skewness and kurtosis in this Taylor 
series expansion as central moments, however, is the clarity with 
which the expression, 
ln(1 )
x  
1 


2
2(1 )2

3
3(1 )3

4
4(1 )4
o(5),
                                                
90. Cf. Jondeau & Rockinger, supra note 69, at 34 (adopting a functionally 
equivalent definition of the Taylor series expansion of expected returns). 
91. Id. at 34 n.5. 
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demonstrates that the investor’s “expected utility depends on all 
central moments of the distribution of the end-of-period wealth.”92
Of even greater significance is what the Taylor series 
expansion implicitly says about the impact of skewness and kurtosis 
on investor welfare. Under rather modest assumptions—“positive 
marginal utility, decreasing absolute risk aversion at all wealth 
levels,” and a “strict consistency” in the investor’s attitude toward a 
given statistical moment without regard to her or his wealth—”the 
following inequalities hold”:93
U(n )(w)  0w, if n is odd and
U(n )(w)  0w, if n is even.
Specifically, investors “have positive preference for positive 
skewness” and “negative preference for negative skewness.”94 The 
Taylor series expansion of any utility function shows “that if the 
third derivative of the utility function is positive, there is a 
preference for skewness.”95 And the preferences “most . . . 
commonly employed in economics and finance reveal a positive 
third derivative.”96
Combining what we already know about variance—that 
investors dislike it, at least on the downside—with this preference for 
positive skewness enables us to generalize to the next moment, 
kurtosis: “Consistent risk aversion, strict consistency of moment 
preference and positive preference for positive skewness imply 
negative preference for the fourth statistical moment (kurtosis).”97 Or 
                                                
92. Id. at 33. 
93. Id. at 34. 
94. Robert C. Scott & Philip A. Horvath, On the Direction of Preference for 
Moments of Higher Order Than the Variance, 35 J. FIN. 915, 917 (1980); see also
Markus K. Brunnermeier, Christian Gollier & Jonathan A. Parker, Optimal Beliefs, Asset 
Prices, and the Preference for Skewed Returns, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 159, 164 (2007). 
95. LEVY, supra note 2, at 61 n.4. 
96. Id.; see also id. at 70-71 (suggesting that decreasing absolute risk 
aversion “implies that investors like skewness” and deducing from this premise that 
the prevalence of a positive third derivative in “the most commonly employed 
preferences” compels close attention to that derivative). “Skewness preferences and 
positive third derivatives are related to third degree Stochastic Dominance.” Id. at 61 
n.4. See generally G.A. Whitemore, Third-Degree Stochastic Dominance, 60 AM.
ECON. REV. 457 (1970). 
97. Scott & Horvath, supra note 94, at 917-18. 
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in even simpler terms: “[I]nvestors like mean return and positive 
skewness and dislike variance and kurtosis.”98 The odd moments, 
mean and skewness, advance returns, while the even moments 
“produce a drag on expected compound return.”99 The alternating 
treatment of odd- and even-numbered mathematical moments 
represents a logical extension of “an essential non-linear feature of 
observed investor behaviour” already “capture[d]” by the single-
sided treatment of semivariance: “[M]ost investors perceive 
infrequent large losses or shortfalls [to be] far more risky than more 
frequent smaller losses or shortfalls.”100
The adage that investors generally “prefer high values for odd 
moments and low ones for even moments” reaches its greatest clarity 
in the extremes of the distribution.101 Odd moments “can be seen as a 
way to decrease extreme values on the side of losses and increase 
them on the gains’.”102 Over the long haul, positive skewness 
indicates the presence of outsized gains; it suggests the tantalizing 
possibility that certain holdings in the portfolio will offer 
disproportionately large payouts, as though they were winning 
lottery tickets.103 By contrast, “even moments measure dispersion, 
and therefore volatility; something undesirable, that increases the 
uncertainty of returns.”104
Combining this insight with the basic, general definition of the 
Taylor series expansion as a function of differentials, factorials, and 
polynomials,  
f (x)  f (a) 
f (a)
1!
(x  a) 
f (a)
2!
(x  a)2  
f (a)
3!
(x  a)3 ,
enables an even simpler approximation of expected returns or 
investor utility as a “preference function”:105
                                                
98. Estrada, supra note 76, at 241. 
99. Id.
100. Balzer, supra note 89, at 130. 
101. Athayde & Flôres, supra note 68, at 1336. 
102. Id.
103. See Turan G. Bali, Nusret Cakici & Robert F. Whitelaw, Maxing Out: 
Stocks as Lotteries and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 427, 
444 (2011). 
104. Athayde & Flôres, supra note 68, at 1336. 
105. Jondeau & Rockinger, supra note 69, at 35. 
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U(w) U(w )
1
2!
U(2)(w )2 
1
3!
U(3)(w )s3 
1
4!
U(4)(w )k4
where s and k designate skewness and kurtosis, again defined as 
central moments. Consistent with our understanding of investor 
responses to odd and even moments, the actual expected utility 
approximated by this function “depends positively on expected 
return and skewness and negatively on variance and kurtosis.”106 In 
this view of the approximate preference function, the work of sorting 
expected return and skewness from variance and kurtosis is 
performed by the sign of the odd- and even-numbered derivatives of 
the utility function. 
IV. SKEWNESS PREFERENCE AND THE LONGING FOR LOTTERIES
Prospect theory illuminates multiple problems in behavioral 
finance. In economics generally and in finance in particular, the real 
challenge lies in “know[ing] exactly how to apply” prospect theory’s 
“many remarkable insights.”107 One of the most useful applications of 
prospect theory begins with an examination of the cluster of 
preferences aptly predicted by the lottery effect within prospect 
theory’s fourfold pattern. It has long been known that many investors 
fail to diversify their portfolios. Many investors hold just a few 
stocks, or even just one.108 The failure to diversify—perhaps more 
persuasively characterized as the tendency to concentrate holdings 
within a portfolio—is the true manifestation of optimism and risk 
seeking. Individual investors, whether optimistic or realistic, tend to 
allocate similar amounts to equity, relative to safer asset classes such 
as bonds or cash.109 The difference is that optimists eschew 
diversification to their detriment.110
Optimism does appear to have positive effects on 
entrepreneurship, self-employment, and raw pleasure in one’s 
                                                
106. Id.
107. Barberis, supra note 26, at 173-74. 
108. See Ronald C. Lease, Wilbur G. Lewellen & Gary G. Schlarbaum, The 
Individual Investor: Attributes and Attitudes, 29 J. FIN. 413, 425 (1974). See generally
Wilbur G. Lewellen, Ronald C. Lease & Gary G. Schlarbaum, Patterns of Investment 
Strategy and Behavior Among Individual Investors, 50 J. BUS. 296, 315 (1977). 
109. See Meir Statman, The Diversification Puzzle, 60:4 FIN. ANALYSTS J.
44, 50 (July/Aug. 2004). 
110. Id. at 45.  
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work.111 But its impact on financial prudence is decidedly mixed at 
best, and arguably quite deleterious to those investors who are 
unfortunate enough to be more confident and optimistic than their 
counterparts. (Gentlemen: I’m speaking to you.112 The greater an 
investor’s distance from women, the worse the results from trading: 
“Single men traded less sensibly than married men, and married men 
traded less sensibly than single women: the less the female presence, 
the less rational the approach to trading in the markets.”113) Optimism 
may also be highlighted by its contrast with its emotional opposite: 
the outsized fear of dying right after buying an annuity, which 
suppresses demand for an otherwise useful financial tool for 
retirement planning.114
The mathematical expression of a sunny outlook is a preference 
for skewness. Positive skewness suggests the possibility that certain 
holdings in the portfolio will offer disproportionately large payouts, 
as though they were winning lottery tickets.115 On average, stocks 
perceived to be positively skewed will earn lower returns.116
This preference for “positively skewed, or lottery-like, wealth 
distributions” may be expressed by adjusting the shape parameters of 
cumulative prospect theory’s weighting functions.117 By shifting 
Tversky and Kahneman’s original gain and loss weighting 
parameters, respectively, from   0.61 and !  0.69118 to   0.4 and 
!  0.65, we can observe an even more pronounced “overweighting 
of low probabilities” in the domain of gains (which is again depicted 
in blue, relative to red for the domain of losses and gold for perfect 
risk neutrality):119
                                                
111. See Manju Puri & David T. Robinson, Optimism and Economic Choice,
86 J. FIN. ECON. 71, 86 (2007). 
112. See Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, 
Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment, 116 Q.J. ECON. 261, 289 (2001). 
113. MICHAEL LEWIS, BOOMERANG: TRAVELS IN THE NEW THIRD WORLD 37
(2011). 
114. See Wei-Yin Hu & Jason S. Scott, Behavioral Obstacles in the Annuity 
Market, 63:6 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 71, 79 (Nov./Dec. 2007). 
115. See Bali, Cakici & Whitelaw, supra note 103, at 428; Nicholas Barberis 
& Ming Huang, Stocks as Lotteries: The Implications of Probability Weighting for 
Security Prices, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 2066, 2080-82 (2008). 
116. See Brian Boyer, Todd Mitton & Keith Vorkink, Expected Idiosyncratic 
Skewness, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 169, 171 (2010). 
117. Barberis & Huang, supra note 115, at 2071. 
118. Cf. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 50, at 311-12.
119. Barberis & Huang, supra note 115, at 2071. The following image was 
generated at WOLFRAMALPHA, http://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=plot+x% 
5E.4%2F%28x%5E.4%2B%281x%29%5E.4%29%5E%281%2F.4%29+and+x%5E.
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The relationship between low returns, positive skewness, and 
investor affinity toward investments offering lottery-like payoffs 
appears across a wide variety of financial settings. 
A. Prize-Linked Savings Accounts  
Americans spent $70.2 billion on lottery tickets in fiscal year 
2014.120 That amount, confined to the forty-four states and the 
District of Columbia where lotteries are legal, exceeds the amount 
spent in all fifty states “on sports tickets, books, video games, movie 
tickets, and recorded music sales.”121 Of the $70.2 billion in lottery 
sales, $19.9 billion was remitted to lottery-sponsoring jurisdictions 
as revenue.122 The profoundly negative economic impact of the 
lottery falls disproportionately on the poor,123 many of whom treat 
                                                                                                      
65%2F%28x%5E.65%2B%281x%29%5E.65%29%5E%281%2F.65%29+and+x+fo
r+x%3D0+to+1 [https://perma.cc/UK3Z-DU46] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). 
120. See Lottery Sales and Transfers, N. AM. ASS’N ST. & PROVINCIAL 
LOTTERIES, http://www.naspl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=content&menuid=17&pageid= 
1025 [https://perma.cc/B7UB-AJ9T] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016) [hereinafter National 
Lottery Data].
121. Derek Thompson, Lotteries: America’s $70 Billion Shame, ATLANTIC
(May 11, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/05/lotteries-
americas-70-billion-shame/392870 [https://perma.cc/XAJ7-P49G]. 
122. See National Lottery Data, supra note 120. 
123. See Charles T. Clotfelter et al., State Lotteries at the Turn of the 
Century: Report to the National Gambling Impact Study Commission 13 (1999), 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/lotfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZUZ-
EXZD] (reporting that “lottery expenditures represent a much larger burden on the 
household budget for those with low incomes than for those with high incomes”).
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the regular purchase of lottery tickets as a form of savings.124 Even 
the economic impact of winning the lottery falls far short of being 
unambiguously positive.125
The yearning for lotteries is sufficiently powerful that banks 
and credit unions, with the strong backing of advocates for higher 
levels of savings and financial literacy among the poor, have resorted 
to depositor lotteries to induce lower- to middle-income customers to 
open and fund savings accounts.126 Although prize-linked savings 
accounts are illegal in states that treat them as nonsanctioned 
lotteries, they are prevalent around the world.127 They operate on the 
same principle as lottery bonds, typically issued by a sovereign that 
promises to redeem a select number of bonds (substantially) above 
face value.128 The practice is actually quite old, with American129 and 
European130 antecedents predating the twentieth century. The oldest 
lottery bond may be the United Kingdom’s “Million Adventure” of 
1694, a lottery intended to retire debt from the then-ongoing Nine 
Years’ War (1689-1697).131
                                                
124. See Tina Rosenberg, Playing the Odds on Savings, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 
2014), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/playing-the-odds-on-saving 
[https://perma.cc/F5PA-GL9Z]. 
125. See generally Guido W. Imbens, Donald B. Rubin & Bruce I. 
Sacerdote, Estimating the Effect of Unearned Income on Labor Earnings, Savings, 
and Consumption: Evidence from a Survey of Lottery Players, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 
778 (2001) (finding that unearned income from lotteries reduces labor earnings, 
especially for players between 55 and 65 years old, and that lottery winners saved 
approximately 16% of their proceeds). 
126. See generally Melissa S. Kearney et al., Making Savers Winners: An 
Overview of Prize-Linked Savings Products, in FINANCIAL LITERACY: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR RETIREMENT SECURITY AND THE FINANCIAL MARKETPLACE 218, 218-19 (Olivia 
S. Mitchell & Annamaria Lusardi eds., 2011). 
127. See Mauro F. Guillén & Adrian E. Tschoegl, Banking on Gambling: 
Banks and Lottery-Linked Deposit Accounts, 21 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 219, 219 (2002). 
128. See, e.g., Bjarne Florentsen & Kristian Rydqvist, Ex-Day Behavior 
When Investors and Professional Traders Assume Reverse Roles: The Case of 
Danish Lottery Bonds, 11 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 152, 155 (2002); Richard C. 
Green & Kristian Rydqvist, Ex-Day Behavior with Dividend Preference and 
Limitations to Short-Term Arbitrage: The Case of Swedish Lottery Bonds, 53 J. FIN.
ECON. 145, 150 (1999). 
129. See Charles W. Calomiris, The Motives of U.S. Debt-Management Policy, 
1790-1880: Efficient Discrimination and Time Consistency, 13 RES. ECON. HIST. 67, 
68-69 (1991); Robert M. Jennings, Donald F. Swanson & Andrew P. Trout, Alexander 
Hamilton’s Tontine Proposal, 45 WM. & MARY Q. 107, 108 (1988). 
130. See Henri Lévy-Ullmann, Lottery Bonds in France and in the Principal 
Countries of Europe, 9 HARV. L. REV. 386, 387 (1896). 
131. See Anne L. Murphy, Lotteries in the 1690s: Investment or Gamble?, 12 
FIN. HIST. REV. 227, 231-34 (2005) (describing the Million Adventure as an offering of 
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B. Private Equity  
At the opposite end of the socioeconomic spectrum from state-
sponsored lotteries, wealthier households indulge in private equity. 
Skewness preference may explain why anyone willingly invests 
large amounts in a single privately held firm,132 despite a wretched 
tradeoff between risk and return. Returns on private equity are 
typically no better than those on publicly traded stocks, and high 
correlation with public equity reduces any diversification value that 
private equity might otherwise offer.133
Investment in private equity, to say the least, is “extremely 
concentrated”: “About 75 percent of all private equity is owned by 
households for whom it constitutes at least half of their total net 
worth.”134 Households holding “entrepreneurial equity invest on 
average more than 70 percent of their private holdings in a single 
private company in which they have an active management 
interest.”135 In many households, “income from entrepreneurial 
ventures”—more generally designated as “proprietary business 
income”—”represents a large source of undiversifiable risk that is 
more highly correlated with common stock returns.”136
In exchange for this “dramatic lack of diversification,” to say 
nothing of the risk inherent in aligning returns from investment with 
highly compensated but easily terminated personal labor, private 
equity investors realize “rather unimpressive” returns that are “no 
higher than the market return on all publicly traded equity.”137
Ownership of entrepreneurial equity therefore constitutes not so 
much an exercise in staking out a personalized corner along the 
                                                                                                      
100,000 tickets at £10 each, with 2.5% (or 2,500) paying prizes ranging from £10 per 
year to £1,000 per year for 16 years); accord Kearney et al., supra note 126, at 223. 
132. See Todd Mitton & Keith Vorkink, Equilibrium Underdiversification 
and the Preference for Skewness, 20 REV. FIN. STUD. 1255, 1255-56 (2007); cf. John 
Y. Campbell, Household Finance, 61 J. FIN. 1553, 1564 (2006) (observing that 
private business assets take the place of public equity holdings in many wealthy 
households); William M. Gentry & R. Glenn Hubbard, Entrepreneurship and 
Household Saving, 4 ADVANCES ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 8 (2004).  
133. See Tobias J. Moskowitz & Annette Vissing-Jørgensen, The Returns to 
Entrepreneurial Investment: A Private Equity Premium Puzzle?, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 
745, 745-46 (2002). 
134. Id. at 745. 
135. Id.
136. John Heaton & Deborah Lucas, Portfolio Choice and Asset Prices: The 
Importance of Entrepreneurial Risk, 55 J. FIN. 1163, 1163 (2000). 
137. Moskowitz & Vissing-Jørgensen, supra note 133, at 745. 
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efficient frontier, but rather a plunge off that frontier in search of 
extreme skewness. Older households, at least, do seem to understand 
the risk inherent in relying too heavily on proprietary business 
income. As households age, they “tend to move to safer assets, by 
substituting riskier proprietary business ownership with stocks, 
bonds, and especially cash.”138
C. Equity Crowdfunding  
Among species of private equity, perhaps none captures 
academic and popular attention as vividly as equity crowdfunding.139
Before 2012, Regulation D of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC),140 the traditional exemption that facilitated the 
offering of securities without SEC registration, made “private 
placement exemptions” from federal securities laws “generally 
unavailable for crowdfunding transactions.”141
In particular, the SEC’s definition of an “accredited investor”142
put Regulation D beyond the reach of most crowdfunding efforts, 
which are not intended to “be limited to investors that meet specific 
qualifications.”143 Natural persons (as opposed to corporations and 
other business or nonprofit entities) seeking to qualify as accredited 
investors must either (1) have a net worth, either alone or with a 
spouse, exceeding $1 million without the benefit of equity in a 
primary residence;144 or (2) report individual income exceeding 
                                                
138. Heaton & Lucas, supra note 136, at 1168. 
139. See generally, e.g., Ajay K. Agrawal, Christian Catalani & Avi 
Goldfarb, Some Simple Economics of Crowdfunding (Nat’l Bureau of Econ 
Research, Working Paper No. 19133, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19133 
[https://perma.cc/3NRL-7P3M]; Paul Belleflamme, Thomas Lambert & Armin 
Schwienbacher, Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd, 29 J. BUS. VENTURING
585 (2014); C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws,
2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012). The popular literature on crowdfunding is 
deep. The title of GARY SPIRER, CROWDFUNDING: THE NEXT BIG THING (2014), 
conveys the sense of breathless anticipation that characterizes that body of work. 
140. Regulation D, Limited Offer and Sale of Securities Without 
Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.500-.508 (2016). 
141. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,389 (Nov. 16, 2015) (final rule 
to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, and 274) 
[hereinafter Final Crowdfunding Rule].
142. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a); see also SEC, OFF. INV. EDUC. & ADVOC.,
ACCREDITED INVESTORS (n.d.), http://www.investor.gov/sites/default/files/ib_ 
accreditedinvestors.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CAG-3EH2].
143. Final Crowdfunding Rule, supra note 141, at 71,389. 
144. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5). 
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$200,000 or joint income with a spouse exceeding $300,000 “in each 
of the two most recent years . . . and ha[ve] a reasonable expectation 
of reaching the same income level in the current year.”145 One 
journalistic source estimated that there were 8.5 million accredited 
investors in the United States in 2014.146
Congress passed the Jump Our Business Startups Act of 2012 
(JOBS Act)147 in order to establish “a regulatory structure for startups 
and small businesses to raise capital” using Internet-based equity 
crowdfunding.148 The JOBS Act was intended to reduce the cost of 
“making relatively low dollar offerings of securities, featuring 
relatively low dollar investments by the ‘crowd.’”149 At the same 
time, the JOBS Act also sought “to protect investors who engage” in 
equity crowdfunding transactions by imposing “investment limits” 
and requiring intermediaries to make disclosures to investors and 
potential investors.150
In concert with the SEC’s final crowdfunding rule 
(promulgated on November 16, 2015),151 the JOBS Act exempts 
qualifying equity crowdfunding transactions152 from registration 
requirements that would otherwise be applicable under § 5 of the 
Securities Act of 1933.153 Exempted crowdfunding securities must 
raise no more than $1 million in any twelve-month period.154
Individual investments in all crowdfunding issuers in a 12-month 
period are limited to “[t]he greater of $2,000 or 5 percent of the 
lesser of the investor’s annual income or net worth if either the 
investor’s annual income or net worth is less than $100,000.”155 A
higher limit of “10 percent of the lesser of the investor’s annual 
                                                
145. Id. at § 230.501(a)(6). 
146. See Devin Thorpe, SEC Mulls Changes to Accredited Investor Standards, 
18 Crowdfunders React, FORBES, (July 15, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
devinthorpe/2014/07/15/sec-mulls-changes-to-accredited-investor-standards-18-
crowdfunders-react [https://perma.cc/5UQN-272S] (crediting “SeedInvest, an equity 
crowdfunding site” with that information).
147. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 
306 (2012). 
148. Final Crowdfunding Rule, supra note 141, at 71,388. 
149. Id.
150. Id. at 71,388-89. 
151. See id. at 71,537-38 (outlining a new regulatory provision to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. § 227.100 (2016)).
152. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012) (codifying a new § 4(a)(6) of the 
Securities Act of 1933). 
153. See id. § 77e. 
154. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(1). 
155. Id. § 227.100(a)(2)(i). 
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income or net worth, not to exceed an amount sold of $100,000,” 
applies “if both the investor’s annual income and net worth are equal 
to or more than $100,000.”156
Qualifying equity crowdfunding transactions must be 
conducted through either a traditionally registered broker-dealer or 
“a new type of entity called a ‘funding portal.’”157 The JOBS Act 
created “funding portals” as online entities that may serve as equity 
crowdfunding intermediaries158 without registering as broker-dealers 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.159 All intermediaries, 
whether registered as broker-dealers or qualified as exempted 
funding portals, must provide regulatory disclosures to investors and 
potential investors in crowdfunding transactions.160
As a brand-new regulatory mechanism for private stock 
placements, the JOBS Act and the SEC’s crowdfunding regulations 
have no track record. The chief executive officer of an equity 
crowdfunding platform predicts that crowdfunding of all types will 
raise $34 billion in 2016, an amount that would surpass venture 
capital.161 What is all but certain is that the companies covered by 
this new mechanism will be offering the lowest-capitalized, least 
liquid, and most starkly skewed securities in the universe of 
investment opportunities. In some respects, the income restrictions 
under the crowdfunding rules are even more stringent than those 
adopted by Regulation D’s definition of an accredited investor, in 
that $100,000 in annual income rather than $200,000 constitutes a 
meaningful regulatory boundary. It takes very little confidence to 
predict that crowdfunded securities, after a few years of interaction, 
will rank among the most highly skewed investment opportunities. 
                                                
156. Id. § 227.100(a)(2)(ii). 
157. Final Crowdfunding Rule, supra note 141, at 71,389; accord 17 C.F.R. 
§ 227.100(a)(3). 
158. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(h) (2012) (codifying a new § 3(h) of the Exchange 
Act of 1934). 
159. See id. § 78o(a)(1) (also known as § 15(a)(1) of the Exchange Act). 
160. See id. § 77d-1 (codifying a new § 4A of the Securities Act); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 227.201(2016). 
161. See Chance Barnett, SEC Approves Title III of JOBS Act, Equity 
Crowdfunding with Non-Accrediteds, FORBES (Oct. 30, 2015), http://onforb.es/ 
1WlWtM4 [https://perma.cc/84KQ-QFW4]. 
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D. The Underpricing of Conglomerates 
Single-segment firms are more highly skewed than highly 
diversified conglomerates operating in the same industry.162
Consequently, conglomerates trade at a discount relative to their 
single-segment counterparts and offer higher average returns in the 
long run.163
E. Stock Options  
The allure of a large potential payoff explains the prevalence of 
stock options rather than stock as such in executive164 and 
nonexecutive165 compensation packages.166 This is merely a variation 
on the more common tendency of employees to eschew 
diversification in their retirement accounts, to the point that some 
401(k) accounts consist entirely of a stock whose correlation with the 
investor’s labor income approaches 100%.167
F. “Death and Jackpot”  
Firms teetering on the verge of default, unsurprisingly, offer 
abnormally low returns.168 Controlling for size and value, studies 
have shown that bankruptcy risk is not rewarded by higher 
                                                
162. See Philip G. Berger & Eli Ofek, Diversification’s Effect on Firm Value, 37 
J. FIN. ECON. 39, 47-48 (1995); Larry H.P. Lang & René M. Stulz, Tobin’s q, Corporate 
Diversification, and Firm Performance, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1248, 1259 (1994). 
163. See Todd Mitton & Keith Vorkink, Why Do Firms with Diversification 
Discounts Have Higher Expected Returns?, 45 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
1367, 1367 (2010). 
164. See Ingolf Dittmann, Ernst Maug & Oliver Spalt, Sticks or Carrots? 
Optimal CEO Compensation When Managers Are Loss Averse, 65 J. FIN. 2015, 
2016 (2010). 
165. See Oliver G. Spalt, Probability Weighting and Employee Stock 
Options, 48 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1085, 1086 (2013). 
166. See generally Brian H. Boyer & Keith Vorkink, Stock Options as 
Lotteries, 69 J. FIN. 1485 (2014). 
167. Cf. ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 169 (3d ed. 2015) 
(observing that the propensity to overinvest in company stock stems from the fact 
that employees tend to “know more stories about their own companies”); Shlomo 
Benartzi et al., The Law and Economics of Company Stock in 401(k) Plans, 50 J.L.
& ECON. 45 (2007); James M. Poterba, Employer Stock and 401(k) Plans, 93 AM.
ECON. REV. 398 (2003). 
168. See John Y. Campbell, Jens Hilscher & Jan Szilagyi, In Search of 
Distress Risk, 63 J. FIN. 2899, 2899 (2008). 
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subsequent returns.169 Because these firms also offer a relatively 
higher probability of extremely large payoffs, however, they excel in 
attracting individual investors (predominantly naïve noise traders), 
but not more sophisticated institutional investors that presumably 
trade on information, to a financial game of “death and jackpot.”170
Jackpots, indeed. Certain investors approach the stock market 
as if finance resembled the lottery and other forms of overt 
gambling.171 One study found that large lottery jackpots in Taiwan 
decreased trading volume among stocks preferred by individual 
investors, especially in stocks with highly skewed, lottery-like 
returns.172 Over-the-counter stocks are known to have extremely 
negative average returns.173 Skewness preference provides the only 
plausible explanation for the willingness of some investors to sink 
money in the “pink sheets.”174
At least in the movies, “[p]lot lines within the genre” of 
gambling stories are not only simple—”the gambler falls into debt; 
the gambler goes after one big score to get even; the gambler either 
does or does not get even”—but also offer some chance of 
redemption as long as “the filmmaker sees gambling as . . . a 
charming hustle” rather than “a catastrophic vice.”175 By contrast, 
gambling in any number of real-life venues—casinos, racetracks, 
state-sponsored lotteries, the pink sheets, one-week fantasy sports—
has an even simpler narrative: the house always wins. 
The inescapable implication is that trading in stocks, at least for 
some investors, is a thrilling form of gambling, interchangeable with 
other forms of risk-seeking entertainment.176 Such thrill seeking may 
                                                
169. See Ilia D. Dichev, Is the Risk of Bankruptcy a Systematic Risk?, 53 J.
FIN. 1131, 1131 (1998). 
170. See Jennifer Conrad, Nishad Kapadia & Yuhang Xing, Death and 
Jackpot: Why Do Individual Investors Hold Overpriced Stocks?, 113 J. FIN. ECON. 
455, 455 (2014). 
171. See Meir Statman, Lottery Players/Stock Traders, 58 FIN. ANALYSTS J.
14, 14-15 (2002). 
172. See Xiaohui Gao & Tse-Chun Lin, Do Individual Investors Treat 
Trading as a Fun and Exciting Gambling Activity? Evidence from Repeated Natural 
Experiments, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 2128, 2128 (2015). 
173. See Bjørn Eraker & Mark Ready, Do Investors Overpay for Stocks with 
Lottery-Like Payoffs? An Examination of the Returns of OTC Stocks, 115 J. FIN.
ECON. 486, 486 (2015). 
174. See id. at 503. 
175. Jay Caspian Kang, The Perfect Predictability of Gambling Movies, N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (Oct. 5, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1j109Ro. 
176. See generally Nicholas Barberis, A Model of Casino Gambling, 58 
MGMT. SCI. 35 (2012); Daniel Dorn & Paul Sengmueller, Trading as 
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even be detectable through neural scans (functional magnetic 
resonance imaging) of brain activity during trading.177 At the same 
time, cognitive bias evidently keeps investors and gamblers from 
recognizing the rather inconvenient truth that the preference for 
“positively skewed assets” systematically “lower[s] returns” on those 
assets, from stocks in general to initial public offerings (IPOs).178
Financial assets are subject to the same psychology that affects 
gambling assets, such as lottery tickets and long-shot bets in horse 
racing.179
Intriguingly, religious differences appear to affect the 
propensity to gamble.180 Although Americans are presumably drawn 
to positively skewed assets, as people around the world appear to be, 
the Protestant churches’ harsh stance toward gambling suppresses 
that preference in certain regions of the United States. By contrast, 
the Catholic Church’s “more lenient view of gambling . . . makes it 
easier for people in Catholic regions to act on their preference for 
skewness.”181 It was a devout Catholic, after all, who framed the 
choice to believe in God as a wager.182 In harmony with these 
conclusions, a study of health and retirement choices found 
“noticeable differences in risk tolerance by . . . religion.”183
“Protestants are the least risk tolerant, and Jews the most.”184 Blaise 
Pascal’s Catholics come “about halfway [in] between.”185
                                                                                                      
Entertainment?, 55 MGMT. SCI. 591 (2009); Mark Grinblatt & Matti Keloharju, 
Sensation Seeking, Overconfidence, and Trading Activity, 64 J. FIN. 549 (2009); 
Alok Kumar, Who Gambles in the Stock Market?, 64 J. FIN. 1889 (2009). 
177. See generally Cary Frydman et. al, Using Neural Data to Test a Theory 
of Investor Behavior: An Application to Realization Utility, 69 J. FIN. 907 (2014). 
178. Brunnermeier, Gollier & Parker, supra note 94, at 159 & n.2. 
179. See id.; cf. Erik Snowberg & Justin Wolfers, Explaining the Favorite-Long 
Shot Bias: Is It Risk-Love or Misperceptions? 118 J. POL. ECON. 723, 723 (2010). 
180. See Alok Kumar, Jeremy K. Page & Oliver G. Spalt, Religious Beliefs, 
Gambling Attitudes, and Financial Market Outcomes, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 671, 671 (2011). 
181. Nicholas Barberis, The Psychology of Tail Events: Progress and 
Challenges, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 611, 615 (2013). 
182. See generally NICHOLAS RESCHER, PASCAL’S WAGER: A STUDY OF 
PRACTICAL REASONING IN PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY (1985). 
183. Robert B. Barsky et. al, Preference Parameters and Behavioral 
Heterogeneity: An Experimental Approach in the Health and Retirement Study, 112 
Q.J. ECONOMICS 537, 550 (1997). 
184. Id.
185. Id.
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V. INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS AS A SPECIAL CASE
The pricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) of stock in 
privately held companies warrants especially close scrutiny.186 In the 
short run, IPOs appear to be underpriced.187 A 2002 study concluded 
that issuers of IPOs on average leave $9.1 million in wealth “on the 
table” after the first day of trading, as measured by the number of 
shares available, times the difference between the first day closing 
price and the offer price.188 The typically sanguine reaction of issuers 
to so much forgone wealth provides keen insight into prospect theory 
and, more generally, into behavioral economics. “Contentment at 
selling an article for one-third of its subsequent value is a rare 
quality.”189
Such tranquility appears to be a psychological artifact. 
“Prospect theory predicts that, in most situations occurring in the 
IPO market, issuers will sum the wealth loss from leaving money on 
the table with the larger wealth gain on the retained shares from a
price jump . . . .”190 In technical terms, issuers are influenced by the 
“covariance of the amount of money . . . and unanticipated wealth 
changes.”191 In simpler terms, it takes extraordinary emotional energy 
to get upset over millions left on the table when an IPO has made 
you a billionaire. 
The underpricing of IPOs also affects underwriters. The 
behavior of underwriters who leave money on the table can also be 
explained in behavioral terms. Underpriced IPOs indirectly 
compensate underwriters in two ways. First, they allow underwriters 
to “reduc[e] . . . marketing costs” in finding buyers for new 
offerings.192 Second, underwriters recoup some of their losses by 
                                                
186. See, e.g., Jay R. Ritter, The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public 
Offerings, 46 J. FIN. 3 (1991). See generally, e.g., INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: AN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Greg N. Gregoriou ed., 2006); Robert E. Wright, 
Reforming the US IPO Market: Lessons from History and Theory, 12 ACCT. BUS. &
FIN. HIST. 419 (2002). 
187. See Ritter, supra note 186, at 3. 
188. See Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, Why Don’t Issuers Get Upset About 
Leaving Money on the Table in IPOs?, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 413, 414 (2002). 
189. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE 389 (5th ed. 1996); accord Loughran & Ritter, supra note 188, at 414. 
190. Loughran & Ritter, supra note 188, at 414. 
191. Id.
192. Id. at 416; see also Alexander Ljungqvist & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., 
Does Prospect Theory Explain IPO Market Behavior?, 60 J. FIN. 1759, 1759-60 
(2005) (concluding that underwriters defer their compensation by extracting higher 
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steering investors to affiliated brokerages, who extract frothy 
commissions from IPO purchasers who rarely object to paying 
inflated fees in exchange for access to the offering.193 In short, “the 
opportunity cost of leaving money on the table [is] less important” to 
underwriters “than the direct fees.”194
Not all IPOs are created alike. The distribution of initial public 
offerings is lopsided. IPOs undergoing downward revisions average 
4% returns on their first day, while IPOs experiencing upward 
revisions return an average of 32% on the first day.195 Underpriced 
IPOs tend to run together in “hot issue” cycles “lasting many months 
at a time, in which the average initial return is much higher” than at 
other times.196 “[I]n the long run,” however, “initial public offerings 
appear to be overpriced.”197 The reason subsists in investor 
psychology: IPO “investors are irrationally over optimistic about the 
future potential of certain industries.”198 Ultimately, notwithstanding 
the initial underpricing of IPOs (at least relative to the offer price 
that would have left none of the issuer’s money on the table), 
investors as a class overpay for IPOs in the long run.199
As the nearest cousins to lotteries in highly liquid, publicly 
regulated stock markets, initial public offerings exhibit long-run 
                                                                                                      
fees from satisfied IPO participants—issuers and purchasers alike—in future 
transactions). 
193. See Loughran & Ritter, supra note 188, at 416. 
194. Id. (citing Richard H. Thaler, Towards a Positive Theory of Consumer 
Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980)). 
195. See Kathleen Weiss Hanley, The Underpricing of Initial Public 
Offerings and the Partial Adjustment Phenomenon, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 231, 235-37
(1993); see also Michel A. Habib & Alexander P. Ljungqvist, Underpricing and 
Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses in IPOs: Theory and Evidence, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 
433, 433-34 (2001). 
196. Ritter, supra note 186, at 3. See generally Roger G. Ibbotson, Jody L. 
Sindelar & Jay R. Ritter, The Market’s Problems with the Pricing of Initial Public 
Offerings, 7 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 66 (1994). 
197. Ritter, supra note 186, at 3 (emphasis added). 
198. Id. at 4. See generally Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and 
Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 1151 (1977); cf. Robert J. Shiller, Speculative 
Prices and Popular Models, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 55, 56 (1990) (describing the 
vulnerability of naïve investors to fads). 
199. See Reena Aggarwal & Pietra Rivoli, Fads in the Initial Public Offering 
Market?, 19 FIN. MGMT. 45, 55-56 (1990) (finding negative returns to investors who 
buy stock in an IPO and hold it for one year and even more negative returns to 
investors who buy stock in early aftermarket trading immediately after an IPO and 
hold that stock for one year). 
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pricing anomalies consistent with prospect theory.200 An economy 
containing investors reacting according to the predictions of prospect 
theory allows IPOs to “be overpriced [to] earn . . . low average 
return[s],” because those investors “value[] . . . highly” the chance, 
even if it is very small, “of a very large return.”201 The higher the 
predicted skewness of an IPO, the lower its expected long-run 
return.202 There are also intriguing relationships between the pricing 
of IPOs, on one hand, and the even-numbered moments on the 
distribution of returns on IPOs. Volatility is negatively related to 
subsequent returns on IPOs; kurtosis, by contrast, is positively 
related.203
There is some disagreement over the plausibility of this 
account of IPOs’ long-run underperformance. One source mildly 
disputes the ability of skewness preference to provide a complete 
explanation for the long-run underperformance of IPOs.204 Five-year 
returns to IPOs are higher for venture-backed firms than for firms not 
backed by venture capital.205 “Because small nonventure-backed 
IPOs are more likely to be held by individuals, bouts of investor 
sentiment are a possible explanation” for these firms’ “severe 
underperformance.”206 “Individuals are arguably more likely to be 
influenced by fads or lack complete information.”207 It is true that 
returns on small IPOs covary with the discount on closed-end funds, 
which is considered another benchmark of investor sentiment.208
Ultimately, however, this critique concludes that 
“[u]nderperformance is a characteristic of small, low book-to-market 
firms regardless of whether they are IPO firms.”209
                                                
200. See, e.g., Nicholas Barberis, Ming Huang & Tano Santos, Prospect 
Theory and Asset Prices, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1, 16-17 (2001). 
201. Barberis & Huang, supra note 115, at 2091. 
202. See T. Clifton Green & Byoung-Hyoun Hwang, Initial Public Offerings as 
Lotteries: Skewness Preference and First-Day Returns, 58 MGMT. SCI. 432, 432 (2012). 
203. See Jennifer Conrad, Robert F. Dittmar & Eric Ghysels, Ex Ante 
Skewness and Expected Stock Returns, 68 J. FIN. 85, 120 (2013). 
204. See Alon Brav & Paul A. Gompers, Myth or Reality? The Long-Run 
Underperformance of Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Venture and 
Nonventure Capital-Backed Companies, 52 J. FIN. 1791, 1820 (1997). 
205. See id. at 1791. 
206. Id. at 1792. 
207. Id.
208. See id. See generally Charles M. C. Lee, Andrei Shleifer & Richard H. 
Thaler, Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle, 46 J. FIN. 75 (1991). 
209. Brav & Gompers, supra note 204, at 1792. 
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On balance, IPO returns follow the fault lines of heterogeneity 
within the class of investors and among financial intermediaries. 
IPOs seeking to attract more sophisticated investors require higher 
returns to attract the interest of investors trading on the basis of 
information rather than faddishness, emotional affinity, or unfiltered 
speculation.210 Prestigious underwriters are associated with lower-
risk offerings, which leave less money on the table (to the benefit 
and delight of issuers as well as underwriters) and therefore lower 
the returns to IPO investors in the long run.211 These traits of initial 
public offerings demonstrate that the investor preferences predicted 
by prospect theory may be reconciled with the conventional capital 
asset pricing model.212
CONCLUSION
Prospect theory and the generalized higher-moment capital 
asset pricing model, as depicted in this Article, provide an 
overarching view of less than fully rational investor behavior. 
Neoclassical economics and the conventional approach to “law and 
economics” born of this tradition have historically confined 
themselves to stylized facts and hypothethical decision-making 
mechanisms. Because “[m]ost economists view[ed] their discipline 
as one that deals with ideally rational behavior,” they generally 
“attach[ed] little significance to discrepancies between what the 
theory predicts and what people actually do.”213 Neither actual 
markets nor behaviorally mediated responses to those markets 
sustain such a sanitized economic vision. Neither finance nor law 
                                                
210. See Richard Carter & Steven Manaster, Initial Public Offerings and 
Underwriter Reputation, 45 J. FIN. 1045, 1045 (1990). 
211. See id. at 1046; Randolph P. Beatty & Jay R. Ritter, Investment 
Banking, Reputation, and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, 15 J. FIN.
ECON. 213, 216 (1986); cf. Randolph P. Beatty, Auditor Reputation and the Pricing 
of Initial Public Offerings, 64 ACCT. REV. 693, 693 (1989).  
212. See Barberis & Huang, supra note 115, at 2068, 2073-74; Enrico De 
Giorgi, Thorsten Hens & Haim Levy, CAPM Equilibria with Prospect Theory 
Preferences (Working paper, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=420184 
[https://perma.cc/CC29-M23K]. 
213. Lola L. Lopes & Gregg C. Oden, The Role of Aspiration Level in Risky 
Choice: A Comparison of Cumulative Prospect Theory and SP/A Theory, 43 J.
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lives by rationality alone, but by every passion that “animate[s] 
people’s ideas and feelings, their animal spirit.”214
Abnormality, in the sense of statistically significant departures 
from Gaussian assumptions, is the modal condition of capital 
markets.215 Confronted with volatility, spillover, and contagion, and 
perhaps even touched by an awareness of profound limits on the 
human ability to detect deep financial threats, human actors take 
refuge in time-worn albeit imperfectly rational heuristics: mental 
accounting, subjective weighting of probabilities, systematic 
disregard of correlation.216
As Tversky and Kahneman have said of prospect theory, even 
if humans make choices that are “not always rational in the 
traditional sense,” behavioral decision-making is neither “chaotic” 
nor “intractable,” but rather is “orderly” according to its own 
criteria.217 The inconvenient fact that neoclassical economics and 
behavioral finance “may be incompatible” with each other in some 
circumstances should “not entail relativism of [the] values” with 
each framework, “only the notion of a plurality of values not 
structured hierarchically.”218 “Humanity, with all its limitations, may 
well be the source of the stability we lack in our more abstract 
conceptions in the universe of finance.”219
From lotteries to initial public offerings, humans strongly 
prefer right-skewed financial instruments and opportunities that offer 
salient possibilities of big upside gains. In concert, prospect theory 
and the higher-moment capital asset pricing model predict that this 
preference will often, perhaps even systematically, drive individuals 
to make investments whose expected value is abnormally low, nil, or 
even negative. What Tennessee Williams has called “the catastrophe 
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of success”220—the financial and moral pitfalls inherent in the 
realization of human desires, or perhaps even in the mere act of 
wishing—appears to arise from the quantum mechanics of human 
judgment under uncertainty. Whether the law elects to disrupt the 
psychophysics of financial decision-making depends on the exercise 
of a distinct and altogether subjective sort of judgment. As do so 
many other questions of law and “welfare economics,” this choice 
“ultimately dissolve[s] into a study of aesthetics and morals.”221
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